II. The Quarterly Context
The quarter, which included most of the campaign period and election day itself, witnessed the heaviest loss of life among the greatly expanded coalition forces for any three-month period since 2001. Across the country, 223 allied soldiers were killed, of which 30 died in combat in Kandahar, including 11 members of the Canadian Forces. As well, August was the deadliest month so far this year for Afghan civilian casualties, with more than two thirds from insurgent violence. Losses remained heavy in the quarter for both the Afghan army and police, although figures were incomplete.
Two significant developments during the quarter intensified international attention on Afghanistan’s progress toward stability. One was the presidential and provincial council elections—the spirited two-month campaign, lower-than-hoped-for voter turnout, allegations of fraud and a still uncertain outcome at the end of September. The second was the release of a detailed assessment by the senior commander of the coalition forces in Afghanistan, stating that the coalition effort was unlikely to succeed without a major shift in approach and mindset, accompanied by a substantial increase in coalition forces. This sombre military assessment followed the arrival of an additional 20,500 U.S. soldiers and marines in the southern provinces. They were deployed as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the 42-nation coalition authorized by the United Nations Security Council and operating under the command of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Canadian Forces are part of ISAF.
Canada’s new Ambassador to Afghanistan,
William Crosbie, visits a polling station in
Kabul on August 20. Ambassador Crosbie
took up his duties in August 2009,
becoming Canada’s fifth Ambassador
to Afghanistan.
Both the Afghan people and the international community had expected conclusive election results by mid-September and there was general disappointment at the lengthy delays. Yet the mere holding of an election is an immense challenge in a country experiencing armed conflict and lacking adequate infrastructure, robust institutions and widespread literacy. Not only did the Afghans manage the nomination process largely in accordance with domestic electoral laws, but the number of candidates increased compared to the 2004 election. For the first time, presidential candidates engaged in political debates on the issues, making use of television and radio.
Through a program administered by the National Democratic Institute, Canada played an active role in supporting and enhancing the capacity of women to compete in the 2009 elections. Two female candidates contested the presidential race and 326 women contested seats in their respective provincial councils—a 14-percent increase over the numbers in 2005. Once election results are finalized, Canada will continue to support the successful female candidates to overcome the unique challenges they will face. The Afghan government and international community have already begun evaluating the electoral experience to improve planning for the parliamentary and district council elections scheduled for 2010.
In July and August the Taliban and other insurgents focused their intimidation efforts on discouraging participation in the elections. On August 20 there were nearly 450 security incidents, the highest number on a single day since 2001. Far fewer Afghans voted than in the 2004 elections and, while reliable figures remain elusive, most observers agreed that the turnout was notably lower in Kandahar. In opinion polling shortly after the election, Kandaharis gave poor security as the main reason for not voting. Nonetheless, the Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan, an umbrella group of Afghan non-governmental organizations, said the turnout demonstrated that Afghans have the “commitment and interest to progress toward an institutionalized democratic system.”
The election was marred by what the UN Secretary-General acknowledged as serious electoral irregularities and fraud, which were still under investigation at the end of September. Perhaps understandably, opinion polling also found a continuing slide in the proportion of Kandaharis expressing a favourable opinion of their government, from roughly 80 percent a year ago to about 70 percent currently. The same poll reported favourable opinion of the Taliban at about 30 percent, representing a modest but steady upward trend during the past two years.
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
Commander, U.S. Army General McChrystal,
talks to Kandahar Governor, Tooryalai Wesa,
during a visit to Dand District, Afghanistan.
Also still unresolved at the end of the quarter was the future nature and magnitude of the counterinsurgency efforts. In an August 30 report, ISAF Commander General Stanley McChrystal recommended implementing a counterinsurgency strategy in which troops give top priority to protecting Afghans rather than seizing terrain or killing insurgents. Many of his suggestions parallel the approach already adopted by the Canadian Forces, as exemplified by Operation Kantolo [see text box on page 8]. General McChrystal, who also commands the U.S. forces in Afghanistan, said this new approach should be supplemented by as many as 40,000 more coalition troops, paralleled by an accelerated build-up of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) to reach strengths of 240,000 and 160,000 respectively. Importantly, General McChrystal’s new counterinsurgency strategy took aim at improving the unity of effort among the coalition partners and between military and civilian organizations at all levels. At the end of September, General McChrystal’s recommendations and the accompanying request for forces were still under consideration by NATO and the U.S. government.
A significant number of U.S. forces arrived in Kandahar province during this reporting quarter, vastly changing the environment in which many Canadians are working. Three extra infantry battalions were stationed in the province, more than doubling the number of coalition forces available for security-related tasks. In addition, a U.S. Military Police battalion arrived in Kandahar City to assist in mentoring ANP units in the region. This influx was accompanied by a concentration of Canadian Forces into a much smaller area of operations focused primarily on the major populated areas in and around Kandahar City. This vastly increased security presence, accompanied by a similar boost in American civilian efforts, will undoubtedly assist the Canadian-coordinated governance and development initiatives throughout Kandahar province and support moving Canadian priorities forward in the months to come.
