II. The Quarterly Context
Overall security conditions throughout much of Afghanistan continued to deteriorate during the quarter. In May and June, the frequency of insurgency attacks nationally was higher than in any month since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. In some instances, this was a result of action by Afghan and international forces seeking to clear and hold areas previously controlled by insurgents.
Kandahar province, where Canada’s efforts are concentrated, experienced a steep increase in the number of enemy-initiated attacks against soldiers, civilians and facilities during the quarter. This followed the yearly trend that usually sees the fighting season start with the end of the poppy harvest, which occurred this year in May. But the frequency of security events in Kandahar was exceptionally high. The number of incidents involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs)—one important measure of insurgent activity—was 108 percent higher than in the same three months of 2008.
Insurgents launched two prominent suicide attacks in April, first against the Kandahar Provincial Council compound and later against the Governor’s Palace. Afghan forces responded quickly to the attacks, and neither the Governor nor Councillors were among the casualties. But these and other attacks (including the assassination of a female member of the Provincial Council) served to intimidate officials and political leaders; after the bombing of the council property, most council members left the province for several weeks before returning.
The Canadian Forces conducted continuing counter-insurgency operations in the quarter with Afghan and allied forces. At the same time, the Canadian Forces and civilians prepared for the incoming deployments of additional U.S. soldiers and marines, and an expanded U.S. civilian contingent of development specialists in southern Afghanistan. The scale of these reinforcements is dramatic: the number of U.S. forces attached to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in the southern provinces began to rise from about 5,900 at the start of the quarter to about 20,000 due by the end of the summer. In Kandahar specifically, U.S. deployments started during the quarter and were expected to accelerate in July.
The influx of U.S. military and civilian personnel had two important implications for Canada. First, it enabled the Canadian Forces (numbering about 2,800 in Kandahar) to concentrate their counter-insurgency operations, and training and mentoring of Afghan forces, in Kandahar City and its populated approaches. The objective is to stabilize security in the provincial capital and nearby villages—an area that is home to more than 75 percent of Kandaharis—providing more safety to residents, and enabling Canadian development and governance activities to advance more quickly. The Canadian Forces therefore shifted focus from disrupting the insurgency in the countryside to protecting the population of Kandahar City and surrounding villages. As part of a new village-based counter-insurgency approach, the Canadian Forces, with Afghan forces, cleared insurgent influence from the village of Deh-e-Bagh on the outskirts of Kandahar City. Employing about 150 villagers at any one time, the project included installing solar-powered streetlights, building roads and digging irrigation canals. And critically, continuous security in and around the village is now maintained by the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP)—Afghans protecting their own people, and creating the safe space for development and governance to grow. The stabilization operation, still underway, has attracted interest from coalition partners and neighbouring villages.
The second implication of these large U.S. deployments was the likelihood of more intense fighting through the summer. ISAF commanders expected that increasing ISAF troop densities, and steadily rising numbers deployed by the Afghan National Army, would lead to more violence as ISAF and Afghan forces extended their presence. This seemed all the more probable as political campaigning gathered momentum in advance of presidential and provincial council elections in August. Indeed, countering the insurgent threat to credible, inclusive and secure elections was one of the reasons behind the U.S. deployments this year. Canada has supported Afghan preparations and planning to secure the electoral process.
The Canadian Forces (almost all based in Kandahar, with the rest in Kabul) are fighting the insurgency as part of ISAF, the 42-country coalition authorized by the United Nations Security Council; ISAF is commanded by NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. At their April summit, NATO allies reaffirmed that Afghanistan remains the alliance’s key priority. Leaders agreed to a significant expansion of NATO training and other support for Afghan forces, and temporary additional military deployments to strengthen security during the election period.
The Canadian Forces have led training and mentoring of the Afghan National Army in Kandahar, and work with Canadian civilian police and U.S. partners to support training and mentoring of the Afghan National Police in the province. Under the House of Commons motion of March 13, 2008, the Canadian military presence in Kandahar is to end in 2011.
